Why India’s Sugarcane Belts Need a Multi-Actor Platform for Water and Soil

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CO AUTHORS

Shailesh Nagar, Partner-NRM, Intellecap & Dr Sangita Ladha, Consultant, Intellecap 

A few years ago, while travelling through the Chandrabhaga valley in Himachal Pradesh’s remote Pangi landscape, I found myself puzzled by an obvious absence. Here was a steep, powerful gorge — the kind of terrain that, almost anywhere else, would have attracted hydropower infrastructure. Yet there was none. When I asked people in Killad, the valley headquarters, why no project had moved forward, their answer was simple: tenders had been awarded, but no private developer could begin work because the road itself could not support the movement of equipment. Until that public investment was made, the private investment, could not follow. 

That moment stayed with me because it illustrates a larger truth about development: economic activity does not begin with enterprise alone. It rests on foundations — roads, bridges, digital connectivity, and, just as critically, natural resources such as water and soil. Some of these foundations are created over millions of years by nature; others depend on deliberate public investment. But unless they are built, maintained and governed collectively by public, private and community actors, the economic structures placed on top of them eventually become fragile.

Sugarcane covers about 3.1% of India’s cropped area, and paddy and sugarcane together absorb roughly 70% of the country’s irrigation water. This is the reason why the sugarcane (along with rice) has remained a focus for any serious conversation on water security in India. In the Krishna and Bhima basins of western Maharashtra — two long, V-shaped valleys running from Pune toward the Karnataka border — this tension plays out on the ground every season. Groundwater is perennial only in the central valley; the uplands on either side are seasonal and drying, and studies of the Upper Bhima basin project further groundwater decline in the range of six metres as sugarcane-driven pumping continues.

Curiously, the same landscape also floods: farmers in the valley’s black clay soils battle waterlogging after heavy monsoon spells, sometimes losing crops to root rot within ten days. Scarcity and excess, in other words, are two symptoms of the same unmanaged system. 

A recent Sankalp dialogue convened by Intellecap brought together an offtaker, a water-research institution, an irrigation technology company, a bilateral development agency and a philanthropic funder to examine why — despite decades of investment — this system remains so hard to fix. In this blog article, I will try to unpack that conversation, as it highlights a pattern that recurs well beyond sugarcane. And this pattern is that India does not have a shortage of capital or technology for natural resource management. It has a shortage of convening. 

The capital may not be the key issue

India’s agriculture sector is worth roughly $600 billion and accounts for 16–18% of GDP.

Public capital aimed at water and soil already flows through multiple schemes such as Atal Bhujal Yojana, which alone has a Rs 6,000-crore outlay, jointly funded with the World Bank, and has been implemented across 8,562 gram panchayats in 80 districts of seven states, including Maharashtra.

On top of that the micro-irrigation subsidy architecture, natural farming missions, MGNREGA-turned-VB-GRAMG labour budgets for water-harvesting structures, and corporate CSR create a condition where capital is abundant.  

Yet convergence between these flows is rare. Government programmes are designed around institutional mandates of a ministry, department or a scheme, each with its own reporting line. An integrated landscape thinking is not integrated in any of them.

The result is duplication (multiple actors building water-harvesting assets in the same micro-watershed) and mistiming (labour-budget funds for conservation structures arriving after, rather than before, the monsoon they were meant to prepare for). The gap is coordination and governance, not capital. 

The drip irrigation paradox

This paradox is most visible in micro-irrigation adoption. The benefits of drip irrigation in sugarcane are well established: field studies across Maharashtra report water savings ranging from 20–65%, most commonly in the 40–50% range, alongside yield increases of 20–40% compared with conventional flood irrigation, and fertiliser savings of roughly 25–30% through fertigation.
 
Even with conservative assumptions — a 25% yield increase, five productive crop seasons, and a system cost of about ₹40,000–50,000 per acre based on official unit-cost norms— the returns should be attractive to most farmers. 
Yet adoption remains limited. In Maharashtra, which has supported sugarcane drip irrigation since 1986, official data show that of roughly 14 lakh hectares under sugarcane, only about 3 lakh hectares — a quarter of the area — were under drip systems as of the most recent government survey.
 
The issue is not awareness or subsidy levels, which stack up to 75–80% of system cost for most farmers, but upfront cash. Many smallholders cannot pay ₹40,000–50,000 per acre and wait months, sometimes a year, for reimbursement. Mills that try to recover the farmer’s share from cane payments face regulatory uncertainty and the risk that farmers sell cane to competing mills. 
 
The barrier is structural, and no single actor — mill, supplier or government — can solve it alone. 
The Blog are reflections from a Sankalp Dialogue on convergence in India’s cane-growing supply sheds 
Reflections from a Sankalp Dialogue on convergence in India’s cane-growing supply sheds
 
By Shailesh Naga, Partner (NRM) & Dr Sangita Ladha, Consultant – Intellecap
 
A few years ago, while travelling through the Chandrabhaga valley in Himachal Pradesh’s remote Pangi landscape, I found myself puzzled by an obvious absence. Here was a steep, powerful gorge — the kind of terrain that, almost anywhere else, would have attracted hydropower infrastructure. Yet there was none. When I asked people in Killad, the valley headquarters, why no project had moved forward, their answer was simple: tenders had been awarded, but no private developer could begin work because the road itself could not support the movement of equipment. Until that public investment was made, the private investment, could not follow.
 
That moment stayed with me because it illustrates a larger truth about development: economic activity does not begin with enterprise alone. It rests on foundations — roads, bridges, digital connectivity, and, just as critically, natural resources such as water and soil. Some of these foundations are created over millions of years by nature; others depend on deliberate public investment. But unless they are built, maintained and governed collectively by public, private and community actors, the economic structures placed on top of them eventually become fragile.
 
Sugarcane covers about 3.1% of India’s cropped area, and paddy and sugarcane together absorb roughly 70% of the country’s irrigation water. This is the reason why the sugarcane (along with rice) has remained a focus for any serious conversation on water security in India. In the Krishna and Bhima basins of western Maharashtra — two long, V-shaped valleys running from Pune toward the Karnataka border — this tension plays out on the ground every season. Groundwater is perennial only in the central valley; the uplands on either side are seasonal and drying, and studies of the Upper Bhima basin project further groundwater decline in the range of six metres as sugarcane-driven pumping continues. Curiously, the same landscape also floods: farmers in the valley’s black clay soils battle waterlogging after heavy monsoon spells, sometimes losing crops to root rot within ten days. Scarcity and excess, in other words, are two symptoms of the same unmanaged system.
 
A recent Sankalp dialogue convened by Intellecap brought together an offtaker, a water-research institution, an irrigation technology company, a bilateral development agency and a philanthropic funder to examine why — despite decades of investment — this system remains so hard to fix. In this blog article, I will try to unpack that conversation, as it highlights a pattern that recurs well beyond sugarcane. And this pattern is that India does not have a shortage of capital or technology for natural resource management. It has a shortage of convening.

The capital may not be the key issue

India’s agriculture sector is worth roughly $600 billion and accounts for 16–18% of GDP.  Public capital aimed at water and soil already flows through multiple schemes such as Atal Bhujal Yojana, which alone has a Rs 6,000-crore outlay, jointly funded with the World Bank, and has been implemented across 8,562 gram panchayats in 80 districts of seven states, including Maharashtra. On top of that the micro-irrigation subsidy architecture, natural farming missions, MGNREGA-turned-VB-GRAMG labour budgets for water-harvesting structures, and corporate CSR create a condition where capital is abundant.
 
Yet convergence between these flows is rare. Government programmes are designed around institutional mandates of a ministry, department or a scheme, each with its own reporting line. An integrated landscape thinking is not integrated in any of them. The result is duplication (multiple actors building water-harvesting assets in the same micro-watershed) and mistiming (labour-budget funds for conservation structures arriving after, rather than before, the monsoon they were meant to prepare for). The gap is coordination and governance, not capital.

The drip irrigation paradox

This paradox is most visible in micro-irrigation adoption. The benefits of drip irrigation in sugarcane are well established: field studies across Maharashtra report water savings ranging from 20–65%, most commonly in the 40–50% range, alongside yield increases of 20–40% compared with conventional flood irrigation, and fertiliser savings of roughly 25–30% through fertigation.  Even with conservative assumptions — a 25% yield increase, five productive crop seasons, and a system cost of about ₹40,000–50,000 per acre based on official unit-cost norms — the returns should be attractive to most farmers.
 
Yet adoption remains limited. In Maharashtra, which has supported sugarcane drip irrigation since 1986, official data show that of roughly 14 lakh hectares under sugarcane, only about 3 lakh hectares — a quarter of the area — were under drip systems as of the most recent government survey.  The issue is not awareness or subsidy levels, which stack up to 75–80% of system cost for most farmers,  but upfront cash. Many smallholders cannot pay ₹40,000–50,000 per acre and wait months, sometimes a year, for reimbursement. Mills that try to recover the farmer’s share from cane payments face regulatory uncertainty and the risk that farmers sell cane to competing mills.
 
The barrier is structural, and no single actor — mill, supplier or government — can solve it alone.

Why data alone does not change behaviour

A second theme was intelligence. India now has much better basin-level water data, including groundwater maps, remote-sensing layers and GIS-based site-suitability tools, supported by open datasets and government platforms. But participants from water-research institutions were clear that data is mainly diagnostic: it can show where the problem is most severe and why, but it rarely changes a farmer’s irrigation choice or a mill’s procurement decision by itself. GIS must move beyond maps to usable insights, backed by field validation and tailored to the specific decisions farmers and mills need to make.
 
Trust is equally important. Unlike dairy, where daily milk pooling has built strong local cooperation over time, cane-growing areas lack a similar second-layer institution. Farmer collectives may exist on paper, but they often do not have the regular interaction or shared incentives that make dairy cooperatives work. Any data or governance system that ignores this or excludes non-cane farmers who depend on the same aquifer, risks serving few interests rather than the shared resource.

What convening actually has to do

Three structural roles emerged from the discussion as necessary, and currently under-supplied.
 
First, a private-sector anchor (typically the offtaker or processor) that can absorb and redistribute value across the chain, and can offer the kind of corporate guarantee that unlocks financing at scale, is the closest thing sugarcane has to farm-and-factory interdependence already built in. But guarantees only work with exclusivity of supply, which itself depends on trust the sector has not yet fully earned.
 
Second, government has to be a co-designer. Several of the strongest countervailing incentives already in the system like subsidised electricity for groundwater pumping, fertiliser subsidies that favour chemical inputs over balanced nutrient management etc sit within government’s own policy architecture. A multi-actor platform cannot outrun these signals. At best it can start locally while treating policy alignment as a longer-term, evidence-driven objective, anchored at the district or river-basin level rather than at state or national scale, since India’s administrative geography (panchayat–block–district–state–national) has no formal tier that matches a river basin.
 
Third, philanthropic capital has a narrow but distinctive role. It can fund the parts of the system that have no natural investor such as inclusive governance design, standardised measurement methodology, and the representation of weaker stakeholder groups. This is mainly because philanthropy, unlike the private sector or government, can afford to fail. A modest investment in sustainable practices in one district, for instance, can unlock adoption at a scale that neither commercial nor public actors were positioned to seed on their own.

The takeaway

The key message is that bringing the right stakeholders together should be treated as essential infrastructure. It requires deliberate design, sustained investment, and a neutral institution that can keep governments, businesses, communities, and experts working together over the long term. For India’s agri-businesses and sectors directly or indirectly dependent on water and soil sectors, this ability to build trust, align interests, and create shared systems may be an even bigger challenge than mobilizing capital or deploying technology.

Sources

[i] ICAR–Indian Institute of Sugarcane Research (2026). Policy Paper 55, p. 13 — sugarcane = 3.1% of India’s total cropped area, 2022–23. https://sugarcane.res.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Policy-Paper-55.pdf ; NITI Aayog (March 2020). Report of the Task Force on Sugarcane and Sugar Industry (Chair: Prof. Ramesh Chand), p. 30 —  https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2023-02/10_Report_of_the_Task_Force_on_Sugarcan_ and_Sugar_Industry_0.pdf
 
[ii] Bharati, L., Sharma, B. R., Amarasinghe, U. A. et al. (2013). Agricultural groundwater management in the Upper Bhima Basin, India: current status and future scenarios. Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 17, 507–517, Copernicus Publications. https://hess.copernicus.org/articles/17/507/2013/hess-17-507-2013.pdf (DOI: 10.5194/hess-17-507-2013).
 
[iii] World Bank data (via The Global Economy): India’s agriculture, forestry and fishing sector was valued at $639.8 billion in 2024, equal to 17.6% of GDP that year. India’s own Economic Survey 2023-24 put the share at 18.2% for FY24.
 
[iv] Press Information Bureau, Cabinet Committee (2019). Cabinet approves Atal Bhujal Yojana, PRID 1597358, Government of India. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1597358 ; and Ministry of Jal Shakti (2022). Atal Bhujal Yojana — written reply in Lok Sabha by MoS Shri Bishweswar Tudu, PIB PRID 1843394. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1843394
 
[v] Water Resources Department, Government of Maharashtra (2021). Report on Impact Assessment Study of Sugarcane in Ghod Command (Micro Irrigation)wrd.maharashtra.gov.in; Gulati, A., Sharma, B., Banerjee, P. & Mohan, G. (2019). Towards Sustainable, Productive and Profitable Agriculture: Case of Rice and Sugarcane, ICRIER Working Paper No. 358, Table 6. icrier.org
 
[vi] NABARD Maharashtra Regional Office (2023–24). Unit Costs for Investment Activities in Agriculture and Allied Sectorsbankofmaharashtra.bank.in; Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare, GoI (2017). Operational Guidelines, Micro Irrigation under PMKSY–Per Drop More Crop, Table 1. pmksy.gov.in
 
[vii] Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Department of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare, Government of India (2022). Evaluation Study: Micro Irrigation under PMKSY-PDMC in Maharashtradesagri.gov.in; Maharashtra State Co-operative Sugar Factories Federation Ltd. (2026). Details of Sugar Factories in Maharashtramahasugar.in
 
[viii] Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare, GoI (2017). Operational Guidelines, Micro Irrigation under PMKSY–Per Drop More Croppmksy.gov.in; Directorate General of Information & Public Relations, Government of Maharashtra (Mahasamvad). mahasamvad.in
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